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Tax Progressivity and Social Welfare with a Continuum of 
Inequality Views* 
 




If public policies should aim at promoting social welfare, then tax progressivity/regressivity should be con-
sidered in terms of its impact on social welfare, rather than as an end in itself. Whether a tax is progressive 
or regressive and how much it affects social welfare depends on how a neutral tax, a tax neither progressive 
nor regressive, is defined. This, in turn, depends on the inequality view taken, that is, on what kind of 
transformation of an income distribution is considered not to change the level of inequality. Kakwani and 
Son (Journal of Economic Inequality, 2021) developed a social welfare-based framework, which enables 
one to decompose the total welfare loss associated with a tax into elements of which one is the welfare 
impact of tax progressivity/regressivity. While Kakwani and Son consider only the inequality views known 
as relative and absolute inequality, we provide a generalisation of the framework to accommodate all inter-
mediate inequality views in the continuum between the two polar views. While the total welfare loss does 
not depend on inequality view, its composition does: for a progressive (regressive) tax, moving closer to 
the relative view reduces (increases) the importance of progressivity (regressivity) for the total welfare 
impact. Thus, the perception of the composition of a given tax-induced welfare loss varies with the inequal-
ity view taken. We apply the generalised framework to assess the impact on social welfare of the Croatian 
tax system, showing that it matters for such an assessment which inequality view is taken.      
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Progresivnost poreza i društveno blagostanje s kontinuumom pogleda na nejednakosti 
 
Sažetak 
Ako je svrha javnih politika podizanje društvenoga blagostanja, onda progresivnost/regresivnost poreza 
treba razmatrati kroz njezin utjecaj na društveno blagostanje, a ne kao cilj po sebi. Je li neki porez pro-
gresivan ili regresivan, te koliko utječe na društveno blagostanje, to ovisi o definiciji neutralnoga poreza, 
naime poreza koji nije ni progresivan ni regresivan. Ta definicija, pak, ovisi o pogledu na nejednakosti, 
odnosno o tome za kakvu se transformaciju distribucije dohotka smatra da ne mijenja razinu nejednakosti. 
Kakwani i Son (Journal of Economic Inequality, 2021) razvili su okvir utemeljen na društvenom 
blagostanju, a koji omogućuje da se ukupni gubitak blagostanja, do kojega dolazi uslijed oporezivanja, 
dekomponira na elemente među kojima je utjecaj progresivnosti/regresivnosti na društveno blagostanje. 
Dok Kakwani i Son razmatraju samo poglede na nejednakosti znane kao relativne i apsolutne nejednakosti, 
mi poopćujemo njihov okvira kako bi uključivao i sve intermedijarne poglede na nejednakosti u kontinu-
umu između dvaju polarnih pogleda. Ukupni gubitak blagostanja ne ovisi o pogledu na nejednakosti, ali 
njegova kompozicija ovisi: kod progresivnoga (regresivnoga) poreza, približavanje relativnom pogledu 
povećava (smanjuje) važnost progresivnosti (regresivnosti) za ukupni utjecaj na blagostanje. Dakle, perci-
pirana kompozicija porezom uzrokovanoga gubitka blagostanja varira s pogledom na nejednakosti. 
Poopćeni okvir primjenjujemo kako bismo procijenili utjecaj hrvatskoga poreznog sustava na društveno 
blagostanje, te pokazujemo da je kod takvih procjena važno koji pogled na nejednakosti zauzimamo. 
 
Ključne riječi: progresivnost; regresivnost; neutralnost; relativne nejednakosti; apsolutne nejednakosti; 
intermedijarne nejednakosti 
 






1   Introduction 
Although taxes exist primarily as a means for governments to finance public expenditures, the political 
attractiveness of a tax is hardly judged solely on the base of its revenue-raising potential. In particular, the 
public tends to demand of taxes to be equitable2, and thus progressivity has traditionally been defended as 
a key element of tax design that helps the society to achieve a more equitable distribution of income and, 
consequently, of living standard, by means of fiscal redistribution. In line with this attitude on the part of 
the public, economists have conceptualised the value of equity itself as deriving from its contribution to 
social welfare. 
The economics literature has long established the relationship between tax progressivity and income 
inequality (e.g., Jakobsson 1976; Kakwani 1977; Lambert 1993).3 Likewise, it has long established the re-
lationship between income inequality and social welfare function as an objective function embodying in a 
formally explicit way both the efficiency and equity considerations (Kolm 1969; Atkinson 1970; Sen 1974).4 
This chain of relationships suggests that tax progressivity is related to social welfare, but unlike the progres-
sivity-inequality and inequality-welfare relationships, the progressivity-welfare relationship has not been 
explicitly explored until very recently. The literature on optimal nonlinear income taxation derives a set of 
marginal tax rates that maximise a (typically utilitarian) social welfare function, subject to a resource con-
straint and incentive compatibility constraints (e.g., Mirrlees 1971; Toumala 1984; Diamond 1998; Saez 
2001).5 In so far as the profile of optimal marginal tax rates across the distribution of pre-tax income deter-
mines the profile of average tax rates, which in turn renders the tax progressive, regressive, or neutral, this 
literature could be interpreted as relating tax progressivity with social welfare. However, in this way, the 
two are related only implicitly, as a by-product, and not directly enough to make the relationship clear.      
In a recent paper, Kakwani and Son (2021) (hereafter: K&S) have developed an analytical frame-
work based on social welfare function, explicating the impact of taxation, and tax progressivity in particular, 
on social welfare. As a general approach, they consider the social welfare impact of taxation, expressed as 
the difference in the level of social welfare after and before a given tax.6 The difference, which cannot be 
positive, but zero at best – i.e., taxation cannot be welfare-improving, only welfare-neutral at best – is de-
composed into three effects. First, the effect of a counterfactual neutral (i.e., neither progressive nor regres-
sive) tax yielding the same revenue as the actual tax. This effect, called the "neutral-tax effect" is always 
 
2 See Saez (2021) for an illuminating account of this. 
3 For a review, see Lambert (2001). 
4 For a review, see Adler (2019). 
5 For a review, see Toumala (2016). 
6 Kakwani et al. (2021) have developed a similar social welfare-based framework dealing with social benefits (i.e., 




welfare-reducing. Second, the effect stemming from the tax's progressivity or regressivity (i.e., non-neutral-
ity), called the "progressivity effect", which is welfare-increasing if the tax is progressive, and welfare-
reducing if the tax is regressive. And third, the effect arising from the tax's horizontal inequity, manifested 
as reranking between tax units, called the "horizontal effect". If there is reranking, this effect is welfare-
reducing, while otherwise it has no impact on welfare. 
K&S derive the decomposition for a number of specific social welfare functions: namely, the S-
Gini (or generalised Gini) (Kakwani 1980; Donaldson & Weymark, 1980, 1983; Yitzhaki, 1983), the At-
kinson (Atkinson 1970), the Kolm (Kolm 1976a, 1976b) and the Bonferroni (Son 2011) social welfare func-
tions.7 In each case, the progressivity effect is interpreted as a measure of tax progressivity with an explicit 
link to the underlying social welfare function. Of the functions used by K&S, only those from the S-Gini 
class can be the base for inequality indices that reflects two alternative inequality views, the absolute and 
the relative, introduced by Kolm (1976a, 1976b). According to the relative inequality view, inequality re-
mains unchanged if all incomes are changed by the same relative amount; that is, if all incomes are multi-
plied by the same number. According to the absolute view, inequality remains unchanged if the same amount 
is added to, or subtracted from, all individuals’ incomes. K&S exploit this and derive two versions of the 
decomposition, one based on the relative, and the other on the absolute inequality view. The key difference 
between them is in the definition of a neutral tax, i.e., the one that is neither progressive nor regressive. 
While in the relative version a neutral tax is a proportional tax (Kakwani 1977) – everyone pays the same 
proportion of the pre-tax income – in the absolute version a neutral tax is a uniform tax – everyone pays the 
same absolute amount of tax. The progressivity effect is taken as to be a social welfare-based measure of 
tax progressivity/regressivity, measuring the social welfare impact of progressivity or regressivity as depar-
tures from proportionality or uniformity, respectively. In the relative version, the progressivity effect turns 
out to be equivalent to the standard Kakwani index progressivity (Kakwani 1977). 
The absolute and the relative inequality views are, however, just two polar or extreme views, while 
there are other views possible, usually referred to as “intermediate” inequality views (Bossert and Pfingsten 
1990; del Río and Ruiz-Castillo 2000, 2001; Ebert 2004; Yoshida 2005; Bosmans et al. 2014). Intermediate 
views can be seen as certain combinations of the absolute and the relative views. In this paper, we contribute 
by generalising the K&S framework to obtain a framework that nests their absolute and relative versions of 
the decomposition as polar special cases, along with the continuum of versions based on intermediate ine-
quality views within the continuum of views ranging from the absolute to the relative. To do that, we adopt 
the approach to intermediate inequality of del Río and Ruiz-Castillo (2000, 2001) and Bosmans et al. (2014), 
 
7 Greselin et al. (2020) applied the K&S general framework to derive the decomposition for the SWF underlying the 




termed “(𝑥, 𝜋)-inequality” by the former and "𝛼-inequality" by the latter authors. According to this ap-
proach, inequality does not change when all incomes are changed by the same relative amount and by the 
same absolute amount, in proportions 𝛼 and 1 − 𝛼, respectively, with 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. The absolute view and the 
relative view are obtained as the special cases corresponding to 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛼 = 1, respectively. Being based 
on the 𝛼-inequality approach, our generalisation builds upon Urban's (2019) generalisation of the Kakwani 
progressivity index to accommodate inequality views other than the relative, on which the standard Kakwani 
index is based (Kakwani 1977). In fact, just as K&S's relative version provides a social welfare-based in-
terpretation of the standard Kakwani index, our generalised version provides such interpretation to Urban's 
(2019) index of 𝛼-progressivity.   
We show that the generalised decomposition of tax-induced welfare change can be expressed as a 
weighted average of K&S's absolute and relative versions, with 𝛼 and 1 − 𝛼 as the respective weights. We 
also show that, while the total welfare impact of a tax does not depend on inequality view, its composition 
does. In particular, for a progressive tax, moving closer to the relative view (i.e., increasing 𝛼) reduces the 
importance of progressivity for the total welfare impact: the welfare-increasing progressivity effect becomes 
smaller relative to the welfare-reducing neutral-tax effect. Conversely, for a regressive tax, getting closer to 
the relative view increases the importance of regressivity for the total welfare impact: the welfare-reducing 
effect of regressivity becomes larger relative to the welfare-reducing neutral-tax effect. 
In an illustrating empirical application, we use the generalised framework to assess the welfare im-
pact of taxation in Croatia in 2017, considering personal income tax, social insurance contributions, and 
indirect taxes (VAT and excises). The results suggest that it matters substantially which inequality view is 
taken while assessing the welfare impact of taxation, and the framework we propose allows for a whole 
continuum of inequality views to be considered and compared.   
The rest of the paper is organised in this way: section 2 presents K&S's social welfare framework; 
in section 3, we provide our generalisation; section 4 is the empirical application; section 5 summarises the 
paper and concludes. 
 
2   Taxation and social welfare: a framework 
In this section, we present the framework of K&S for the analysis of the impact of taxation on social welfare. 
Section 2.1 introduces notation and the social welfare function used. K&S's decomposition of the welfare 
impact of taxation is derived in section 2.2.8  
 
 




2.1   Taxation and the S-Gini social welfare function 
Denote pre-tax and post-tax incomes by 𝑥 and 𝑦 = 𝑦(𝑥), respectively. The two differ by the amount of tax, 
𝑡(𝑥): 𝑡(𝑥) = 𝑥 − 𝑦(𝑥). Denote the means of 𝑥, 𝑦, and 𝑡 by 𝜇𝑥, 𝜇𝑦, and 𝜇𝑡, respectively.9 Let the density func-
tions of 𝑥 and 𝑦 be, respectively, 𝑓(𝑥) and 𝑓 ∗(𝑦), with the corresponding cumulative distribution functions 
𝐹 (𝑥) and 𝐹 ∗(𝑦). 
K&S's framework accommodates a number of different social welfare functions (SWF's), including 
the S-Gini class (Kakwani 1980; Donaldson & Weymark, 1980, 1983; Yitzhaki, 1983), the Atkinson class 
(Atkinson 1970), the Kolm SWF (Kolm 1976a, 1976b), and the Bonferroni SWF (Son 2011). Here we 
consider the S-Gini class only, and for the following reason. Unlike the other SWF's considered by K&S, 
the S-Gini class can be the base for both relative and absolute inequality and concentration indices, that is, 
it accommodates both the relative and absolute inequality views. K&S exploit this feature and derive their 
framework in two versions, one relying on the relative, the other on the absolute inequality view. This is 
crucial for us, as in this paper we aim to provide a generalised framework which accommodates not only 
the two polar inequality views, but intermediate views as well.  
The S-Gini class of SWF's is a class of rank-dependent SWF's, where each person’s income is 
weighted by a weight which depends on her relative rank in the income distribution. Assuming that all pre-
tax incomes are non-negative, the pre-tax social welfare is 
𝑊𝑥 ≔ ∫ 𝑥
∞
0 𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥, (1) 
where 𝜔(𝐹 (⋅), 𝜌) is the S-Gini social welfare weight. The latter takes the form 
𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌) ≔ 𝜌(1 − 𝐹 (𝑥))𝜌−1, (2) 
where 𝜌 is an ethical parameter. For any 𝜌 > 1, the weight is decreasing with income, and so is the marginal 
social welfare associated with marginal increase of income of those with income equal to 𝑥. The larger the 
𝜌, the faster the weight decreases with income, and the larger the difference in the weight between two 
persons with different incomes (i.e., different ranks in the distribution).10,11 Moreover, the weights integrate 
to one: ∫ 𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)∞0 𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥 = 1. Fixing 𝜌 at a specific value amounts to choosing a specific SWF from 
 
9 We slightly abuse notation: for simplicity, throughout the paper we use lowercase letters for both variables and their 
specific values. For example, 𝑥 denotes pre-tax income both as a variable and its specific value. In addition, statistics 
computed on a vector of values of a variable will be subscripted by the appropriate lowercase letter: for example, the 
mean pre-tax income is denoted by 𝜇𝑥. 
10 In other words, the larger the 𝜌, the steeper the curve depicting 𝜔(𝐹 (𝑧), 𝜌) as a function of 𝐹 (𝑧). For a detailed 
discussion, see Araar and Duclos (2006). 
11 Note that in (1), by using the notation 𝑊𝑥, we do not indicate that the social welfare depends on 𝜌. We do so for 
notational simplicity only. We follow this convention throughout the paper, so that any expression depending on 𝜌 is 




the S-Gini class. For example, 𝜌 = 2 yields the Sen SWF (Sen 1974), the one that underlies the standard 
Gini coefficient. In parallel with (1), the post-tax social welfare is given by: 
𝑊𝑦 ≔ ∫ 𝑦
∞
0 𝜔(𝐹 ∗(𝑦), 𝜌)𝑓 ∗(𝑦)d𝑦. (3) 
The order obtained by sorting the population from the lowest to the highest post-tax income need 
not be identical to the order obtained when the population is sorted in ascending order of pre-tax income, as 
the tax may lead to some reranking of persons. To recognise this is critical for the definition of a different 
notion of social welfare than that underlying (2) and (3), which we require for the analysis to follow. Imagine 
that the population is sorted by post-tax income, but that in calculating the post-tax social welfare the 𝜔-
weights are ascribed to individuals as if they were sorted in ascending order of pre-tax income. In other 
words, imagine that the social welfare associated with post-tax incomes is obtained using the pre-tax instead 
of the post-tax weighting scheme: 
𝛹𝑦 ≔ ∫ 𝑦(𝑥)
∞
0 𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥. (4) 
K&S call 𝛹𝑦 the “pseudo social welfare” and prove that 𝛹𝑦 ≥ 𝑊𝑦 (K&S, Appendix, Theorem A.2), 
meaning that reranking always leads to a welfare loss. For later use12, let us also define 
𝛹𝑡 ≔ 𝑊𝑥 − 𝛹𝑦 = ∫ 𝑡(𝑥)
∞
0 𝜔(𝐹 (𝑡), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥. (5) 
With the above notation, for pre- and post-tax incomes, the S-Gini social welfare and the corre-
sponding S-Gini coefficients are related as follows: 
𝑊𝑥 = 𝜇𝑥(1 − 𝐺𝑥), i.e.  𝐺𝑥 = 1 − 𝑊𝑥𝜇𝑥 , (6a) 
𝑊𝑦 = 𝜇𝑦(1 − 𝐺𝑦),  i.e.     𝐺𝑦 = 1 − 𝑊𝑦𝜇𝑦 , (6b) 
where 𝐺𝑥 and 𝐺𝑦 stand for the S-Gini coefficients of pre- and post-tax income, respectively. In addition, 
𝛹𝑦 = 𝜇𝑦(1 − 𝐷𝑦),  i.e.     𝐷𝑦 = 1 − 𝛹𝑦𝜇𝑦 , (7a) 
𝛹𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝐷𝑡), i.e.  𝐷𝑡 = 1 − 𝛹𝑡𝜇𝑡 , (7b) 
 




where 𝐷𝑦 and 𝐷𝑡 are the S-concentration coefficients of 𝑦 and 𝑡, respectively, when the population is sorted 
by pre-tax income 𝑥.13 As we said above, K&S prove that that 𝛹𝑦 ≥ 𝑊𝑦, implying that 𝐷𝑦 ≤ 𝐺𝑦 always 
holds as well. 
What enables the S-Gini class to be the base of both relative and absolute inequality indices is the 
fact that a SWF from this class is both relatively and absolutely homogeneous of degree one. Relative ho-
mogeneity of degree one means that if all incomes are multiplied by the same factor 𝜆, the level of social 
welfare is also scaled by the same factor: 𝑊𝜆𝑥 = 𝜆𝑊𝑥, 𝜆 > 0 (and analogously for 𝑊𝑦, 𝛹𝑦, and 𝛹𝑡). Absolute 
homogeneity of degree one means that if all incomes are added or subtracted the same amount 𝜐, the level 
of social welfare changes by that amount: 𝑊𝑥+𝜐 = 𝑊𝑥 + 𝜐 (and analogously for 𝑊𝑦, 𝛹𝑦, and 𝛹𝑡).   
 
2.2   The welfare impact of taxation and its decomposition 
In the transition from pre-tax to post-tax income the S-Gini social welfare is changed by the amount 𝑊𝑦 −
𝑊𝑥. K&S propose the following decomposition of the welfare change, which holds for any S-Gini parameter 
𝜌 > 1: 
𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥 = −𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝐺𝑥)⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟
neutral-tax effect
+ 𝜇𝑡(𝐷𝑡 − 𝐺𝑥)⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟
progressivity effect




where 𝜏 ≡ 𝜇𝑡/𝜇𝑥 is the average tax rate. The first term on the right-hand side of (8), −𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝐺𝑥), called the 
neutral-tax effect, is the welfare loss that would result from imposing a counterfactual proportional equal-
yield tax, 𝑡𝑝 = 𝜏𝑥, instead of the actual tax 𝑡. Levying 𝑡𝑝 would collect the same tax revenue as 𝑡, by taking 
from everyone the same proportion of the pre-tax income, and causing no changes in relative inequality 
level and no reranking. The second term, 𝜇𝑡(𝐷𝑡 − 𝐺𝑥), called the progressivity effect, measures the welfare 
change due to the departure of the actual tax from proportionality. More precisely, it measures the increase 
(decrease) of welfare caused by the tax system's progressivity (regressivity). Finally, the horizontal effect, 
𝑊𝑦 − 𝛹𝑦, represents the loss of welfare due to reranking of income units caused by the tax, a manifestation 
of horizontal inequity. Reranking does not cause a welfare loss per se, as the social welfare function does 
not embody aversion to horizontal inequity. Rather, reranking is welfare-reducing only insofar as it offsets 
the welfare-increasing effect of progressivity. Added up together, the progressivity and horizontal effects 
make up what may be called the revenue-neutral inequality effect, measuring the welfare change on account 
of the tax-induced change in relative inequality, keeping the tax revenue unchanged. 
 





Decomposition (8) reflects the relative inequality view, which holds that inequality remains un-
changed if taxation changes the incomes of all persons in equal proportion. A proportional tax, which takes 
the same proportion of everyone’s pre-tax income, represents such a change. In contrast, the absolute ine-
quality view holds that inequality is unchanged if all incomes are changed by an equal absolute amount. 
Besides decomposition (8), K&S also derive the following decomposition of the welfare change, which 
reflects the absolute inequality view: 
𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥 = −𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡𝐷𝑡 + (𝑊𝑦 − 𝛹𝑦). (9) 
The switch from the relative to the absolute inequality view does not affect the size of the welfare 
impact being decomposed; what changes only is how it is decomposed. The neutral-tax effect, −𝜇𝑡, now 
shows the welfare reduction due to a counterfactual uniform equal-yield tax, 𝑡𝑢 = 𝜏𝜇𝑥 = 𝜇𝑡. This tax yields 
the same tax revenue as the actual tax 𝑡, while keeping absolute inequality unchanged. Contrast this with 
the previously introduced counterfactual proportional equal-yield tax 𝑡𝑝 = 𝜏𝑥, which yields the same tax 
revenue, while keeping relative inequality unchanged. 
Dividing the decompositions (8) and (9) by 𝜇𝑡, one obtains the decomposition of welfare change per 
unit of tax revenue for the relative and absolute inequality views, respectively, as 
𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥𝜇𝑡 = −(1 − 𝐺𝑥) + (𝐷𝑡 − 𝐺𝑥) +
𝑊𝑦 − 𝛹𝑦𝜇𝑡 , (10) 𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥𝜇𝑡 = −1 + 𝐷𝑡 +
𝑊𝑦 − 𝛹𝑦𝜇𝑡 , (11) 
where 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐺𝑥 and 𝐷𝑡  represent the Kakwani index of progressivity (Kakwani, 1977) for the relative and 
the absolute inequality views, respectively. In each decomposition, the Kakwani index has a clear interpre-
tation: it represents the welfare gain (loss) per unit of tax revenue due to tax progressivity (regressivity). 
Expressing the welfare change per unit of tax revenue, as in (10) and (11), is useful as it makes possible 
comparisons between the welfare impacts of taxes differing in size (i.e., differing in the average tax rate). 
Note that the horizontal effect, reflecting the welfare loss due to reranking, is same for both inequality views, 
since the phenomenon of reranking is independent of how the standard of neutrality is defined.14 
 
3   A generalisation to a continuum of inequality views 
In this section, we generalise the K&S decomposition of the social welfare impact of taxation by considering 
not only the relative and absolute inequality views (equations (10) and (11), respectively), but the whole 
 
14 In K&S, the horizontal effects in the relative and absolute decompositions are not the same, but only because they 




continuum of intermediate inequality views in between the two polar views. Again, the following presenta-
tion holds, without any modification, for any 𝜌 > 1.  
 
3.1   The Kakwani index with a continuum of inequality views 
At the end of section 2.2, we mentioned the relative and absolute Kakwani indices. The relative one is 
probably the most popular and widely used scalar measure of tax progressivity. In contrast, its absolute 
counterpart is rarely used in applied work, arguably because the standard analysis of inequality in general – 
and of income redistribution in particular – implicitly assumes the relative inequality view. Despite the rich 
literature on income inequality and tax progressivity for alternative inequality views, they are still seldom 
present in empirical research. In the remainder of this section, we show how the standard Kakwani index 
can be generalized to accommodate various inequality views. 
The relative Kakwani index, 
𝐾rel ≔ 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐺𝑥, (12) 
measures the deviation of the actual tax from proportionality. To illustrate this, imagine a tax 𝑡𝑝 = 𝜏𝑥, which 
provides the same amount of tax revenue as the actual tax 𝑡, but is proportional to pre-tax income. Because 
the Gini and concentration indices are relative inequality measures (i.e., invariate to equi-proportional 
changes in the income distribution), the concentration index of the hypothetical proportional tax is equal to 
the Gini index of pre-tax income: 𝐷𝑡𝑝 = 𝐺𝑥. Therefore, the equation (12) becomes 
𝐾rel = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡𝑝, (13) 
which clarifies the interpretation of 𝐾rel: it measures the extent of deviation from proportionality. A tax 𝑡 is 
progressive (regressive) (neutral) if 𝐷𝑡 > 𝐷𝑡𝑝 (𝐷𝑡 < 𝐷𝑡𝑝) (𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑝), that is, if it is more (less) (equally) 
concentrated along the distribution of pre-tax income than the proportional tax 𝑡𝑝. 
Thus, it is the proportional tax that is used here as the reference to determine whether a tax is pro-
gressive or regressive. Put differently, proportionality is taken as the standard of inequality neutrality. This 
is but one possibility, however, reflecting one polar inequality view, namely the relative view. Alternative 
possibilities, reflecting alternative inequality views, are available as well. Switching from one inequality 
view to another boils down to choosing a different reference tax, one that is neutral according to a different 
standard of neutrality. Choose, for instance, a uniform (lump-sum) tax yielding the same revenue as the 
actual tax, 𝑡𝑢 = 𝜇𝑡, as the reference neutral tax; that is, take “uniformity” as the standard of neutrality. This 
choice brings us to the other polar inequality view, the absolute view. As for the relative inequality view, 
where the Kakwani index is the difference between the concentration indices of the actual and the propor-




concentration index of the actual and the uniform reference tax. Thus, the Kakwani index for the absolute 
view is 
𝐾abs ≔ 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡𝑢 = 𝐷𝑡, (14) 
where the second equality is due to 𝐷𝑡𝑢 = 0. 
The range of possibilities is not exhausted by the two polar views, however, as there is a continuum 
of intermediate inequality views in between the relative and absolute poles. Relying on the concept of in-
termediate inequality of del Río and Ruiz-Castillo (2000; 2001) and Bosmans et al. (2014), called (𝑥, 𝜋)-
inequality by the former authors, and 𝛼-inequality by the latter, Urban (2019) proposes a generalized version 
of the Kakwani index, one which incorporates the continuum of inequality views.15 First, for the actual tax 
define its 𝛼-inequality-neutral equal-yield counterpart: 
𝑡𝛼 ≔ 𝛼𝜏𝑥 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜏𝜇𝑥 = 𝛼𝜏𝑥 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝑡, (15) 
where 𝛼 is the parameter of inequality view. For 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0, the above discussed relative and absolute 
views are obtained, respectively; for other values of 𝛼, a range of intermediate inequality views are obtained. 
𝑡𝛼 is the reference neutral tax corresponding to one in the range of 𝛼-inequality views. This reference tax is 
in accordance with the standard of neutrality obtained by combining proportionality and uniformity in pro-
portions 𝛼 and 1 − 𝛼, respectively. The generalized, 𝛼-Kakwani index is given by 
𝐾𝛼 ≔ 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡𝛼 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥, (16) 
where the second equality is due to the fact 𝐷𝑡𝛼 = 𝛼𝐺𝑥.16 Note that this equality means that obtaining 𝐷𝑡𝛼  
does not require obtaining 𝑡𝛼 beforehand; it suffices to choose 𝛼 and to know 𝐺𝑥.17 The Kakwani indices 
corresponding to the relative and absolute inequality views are special cases of 𝐾𝛼: 𝐾rel = 𝐾1 and 𝐾abs =
𝐾0, respectively. 
A given tax may be progressive for some values of 𝛼, and regressive for other values: that is, for 
given 𝐷𝑡 and 𝐺𝑥, the nature of a tax’s departure from neutrality may vary with 𝛼. Denote by 𝛼 ̃the value of 
𝛼 for which the tax is 𝛼-neutral, that is, for which the generalised Kakwani index 𝐾𝛼 is zero. Thus, 𝛼 ̃ is 
defined by 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑥 = 0, implying 𝛼̃ = 𝐷𝑡/𝐺𝑥. For all 𝛼 > 𝛼,̃ the tax is regressive (𝐾𝛼 < 0), while for all 
𝛼 < 𝛼,̃ the taxis progressive (𝐾𝛼 > 0). Assuming 𝐺𝑥 > 0, we can differentiate five cases. 
Case 1: 𝐷𝑡 > 𝐺𝑥. In this case, 𝛼̃ > 1, and thus the tax is progressive for all 𝛼 ∈ [0,1]. An example 
is a tax where the average tax rate at the level of pre-tax income 𝑥, 𝜏(𝑥) = 𝑡(𝑥)/𝑥 (i.e., the fraction of 𝑥 taxed 
away), increases with 𝑥. Consequently, the tax liability, 𝑡(𝑥), also increases with 𝑥. 
 
15 Urban (2019) refers to Bosmans et al. (2014) as the originators of this approach to intermediate inequality. 
16 For a proof, see section A.1 in Appendix. 




Case 2: 𝐷𝑡 = 𝐺𝑥. In this case, 𝛼̃ = 1, and thus the tax is neutral for 𝛼 = 1, and progressive for all 
𝛼 ∈ [0,1). That is, the tax is neutral according to the relative view, and progressive for all other views. An 
example is a proportional tax where 𝜏(𝑥) does not vary with 𝑥, but rather equals the overall average tax rate: 
𝜏(𝑥) = 𝜏 = 𝜇𝑡/𝜇𝑥. Consequently, 𝑡(𝑥) increases with 𝑥. 
Case 3: 0 < 𝐷𝑡 < 𝐺𝑥. In this case, 0 < 𝛼̃ < 1, and thus the tax is progressive for all 𝛼 ∈ [0, 𝐷𝑡/𝐺𝑥), 
neutral for 𝛼 = 𝐷𝑡/𝐺𝑥, and regressive for all 𝛼 ∈ (𝐷𝑡/𝐺𝑥, 1]. An example is a tax where 𝜏(𝑥) decreases with 
𝑥, while 𝑡(𝑥) increases with 𝑥. 
Case 4: 𝐷𝑡 = 0. In this case, 𝛼̃ = 0, and thus the tax is neutral for 𝛼 = 0, and regressive for all 𝛼 ∈
(0,1]. An example is a uniform tax where 𝑡(𝑥) does not vary with 𝑥, but rather equals the average tax amount, 
𝑡(𝑥) = 𝜇𝑡. Consequently, 𝜏(𝑥) decreases with 𝑥. 
Case 5: 𝐷𝑡 < 0. In this case, 𝛼̃ < 0, and thus the tax is regressive for all 𝛼 ∈ [0,1]. An example is a 
tax where both 𝑡(𝑥) and 𝜏(𝑥) decrease with 𝑥. 
Not all these cases are equally likely to be part of a real-world tax system. Indeed, a tax exemplary 
of case 5 is hardly observed in any country. Perhaps the closest to it would be an excise on a good or service 
whose absolute consumption (i.e., not only its budget share) decreases with pre-tax income. Cases 2 and 4 
are not so unlikely to exist, although certainly not in the exact form presented above, but only approximately. 
As we will see later on, social insurance contributions in Croatia correspond approximately to case 2. Cases 
1 and 3 are regularly observed in the real world as personal income tax and the value added tax (or all 
indirect taxes considered together), respectively.   
 
3.2   Decomposing the welfare impact of taxation in the 𝜶-inequality framework 
As we have seen in section 2.2, K&S proposed decompositions of the welfare impact of taxation for the 
relative and absolute inequality views. Here we generalise their decomposition framework by combining it 
with the above discussed Urban’s (2019) generalisation of the Kakwani index to intermediate inequality 
views. We derive a generalised decomposition, which allows the implementation of a whole range of ine-
quality views. The generalised decomposition nests the decompositions from equations (10) and (11) as 
special cases. 
We start with the concept of counterfactual post-tax income, 𝑦𝛼, obtained by subtracting the equal-
yield 𝛼-neutral tax, as defined in (15), from pre-fiscal income: 𝑦𝛼 = 𝑥 − 𝑡𝛼 . According to the 𝛼-inequality 
concept, 𝑦𝛼 has same inequality as 𝑥. Moreover, since 𝑡𝛼 yields the same revenue as 𝑡, we have 𝜇𝑡𝛼 = 𝜇𝑡, 
and consequently 𝜇𝑦𝛼 = 𝜇𝑦. The pseudo social welfare arising from 𝑦𝛼, is given by 
𝛺𝛼 ≔ ∫ 𝑦𝛼(𝑥)
∞
0 𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓 (𝑥)d𝑥 = 𝜇𝑦(1 − 𝐷𝑦𝛼), (17) 
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This is the level of welfare achieved without affecting 𝛼-inequality, while collecting the same amount of 
revenue as with the actual tax. Note that unlike other levels of welfare (𝑊𝑥, 𝑊𝑦) or pseudo welfare (𝛹𝑦, 𝛹𝑡), 
this one depends on 𝛼. 
The welfare impact of taxation per unit of tax collected is decomposed as follows:18 
Δ𝑊 = 𝑁(𝛼) + 𝑃 (𝛼) + 𝐻, (18a) 
where 
Δ𝑊 ≔ 1𝜇𝑡 (𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥), (18b) 
𝑁(𝛼) ≔ 1𝜇𝑡 (𝛺𝛼 − 𝑊𝑥) = −(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥), (18c) 
𝑃 (𝛼) ≔ 1𝜇𝑡 (𝛹𝑦 − 𝛺𝛼) = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥, (18d) 
𝐻 ≔ 1𝜇𝑡 (𝑊𝑦 − 𝛹𝑦) =
𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦). (18e) 
By setting 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0, equation (18a) turns into the decomposition of the welfare impact of 
taxation for the relative and absolute inequality view, respectively, while an 𝛼 between 0 and 1 yields an 
intermediate, 𝛼-specific decomposition. An 𝛼-specific decomposition can be interpreted as a weighted av-
erage of the decompositions specific to the relative and absolute inequality views, with the weights 𝛼 and 
(1 − 𝛼), respectively. This can be verified by multiplying (10) by 𝛼 and (11) by (1 − 𝛼), and adding them 
up to obtain (18a). 
The first term on the right-hand side of (18a), the 𝛼-neutral tax effect 𝑁(𝛼), is the welfare impact 
of the 𝛼-neutral equal-yield tax 𝑡𝛼. Precisely, it is the welfare loss per dollar of the tax: if the tax were 𝛼-
neutral, each dollar the tax raised would reduce social welfare by 𝑁(𝛼) dollars. The second term, the 𝛼-
progressivity effect 𝑃 (𝛼), represents the welfare impact of the departure of the tax from 𝛼-neutrality; it is 
positive (negative) (zero) or welfare-increasing (welfare-reducing) (welfare-neutral) if the tax is 𝛼-progres-
sive (𝛼-regressive) (𝛼-neutral). This effect is equal to the generalised Kakwani index of Urban (2019), given 
by equation (16) above. Hence, the five cases discussed in section 3.1 apply here as well. The third term, 
the horizontal effect 𝐻 , measures the welfare impact of reranking caused by the tax, which may be either 
negative (welfare-reducing) or zero (welfare-neutral), but may not be positive (welfare-increasing).19 
Note that when the tax is 𝛼-neutral, then not only 𝑃 (𝛼) = 0 (by definition of 𝛼-neutrality), but also 
𝐻 = 0, as an 𝛼-neutral tax cannot cause reranking.20 Intuitively, it is obvious that neither a relatively neutral 
 
18 For a proof, see section A.2 in Appendix. 
19 K&S prove that that 𝛹𝑦 ≥ 𝑊𝑦, implying that 𝐷𝑦 ≤ 𝐺𝑦. Thus, 𝐻 > 0 is never true. 
20 For a proof, see section A.3 in Appendix. 
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nor an absolutely neutral tax can cause reranking. If reranking cannot occur in these polar cases, then it 
cannot occur in an intermediate case either, which is a combination of the polar cases. 
Moreover, note that the welfare loss due to 𝑁(𝛼) and 𝐻  (if there is reranking) cannot be outweighed 
by a sufficiently large positive 𝑃 (𝛼); at best, 𝑃 (𝛼) can fully offset the welfare reduction arising from the 
other two effects. Thus, the total welfare impact of a tax cannot be positive; it can be zero at best.21 The 
conditions that must be satisfied for the total welfare impact to be zero are: (i) the only taxpayer is the person 
with the highest pre-tax income (𝐷𝑡 = 1), and (ii) the tax does not change this person's rank (𝐻 = 0).22 The 
condition (ii) implies that the taxpayer's tax liability, which is the aggregate tax collected, must be equal to 
the difference between the taxpayer's pre-tax income and the pre-tax income of the second richest person in 
the pre-tax distribution. While 𝐻 = 0, or at least 𝐻 ≈ 0, is typical in practice, 𝐷𝑡 = 1 is practically impos-
sible. Thus, in all relevant cases, the total welfare impact is a welfare loss, Δ𝑊 < 0. 
 
3.3   How the decomposition changes with inequality view       
The total welfare loss and the horizontal effect are the same as in decompositions (10) and (11) since they 
are defined with no reference to the standard of neutrality: as indicated by expressions (18b) and (18e), 
neither depends on 𝛼. In contrast, the neutral-tax and progressivity effects are inequality view-specific and 
thus depend on 𝛼, as can be seen from expressions (18c) and (18d). How do changes in the parameter 𝛼 
affect the decomposition (18a)? Since Δ𝑊  and 𝐻  are invariant to changes in 𝛼, when 𝛼 changes the other 
two effects, 𝑁(𝛼) and 𝑃 (𝛼), must change by the same magnitude, but in opposite directions: 𝜕𝑁(𝛼)/𝜕𝛼 =
𝐺𝑥 > 0, 𝜕𝑃 (𝛼)/𝜕𝛼 = −𝐺𝑥 < 0. What the changes in these two effects mean and how should they be inter-
preted? 
Since 𝑁(𝛼) < 0, an increase in 𝛼 reduces the absolute value of 𝑁(𝛼), which means that the welfare 
loss of the equal-yield 𝛼-neutral tax is monotonically decreasing as one moves from the absolute inequality 
view towards the relative. To understand why, consider how an 𝛼-neutral tax, amounting to one dollar on 
average, would affect welfare per dollar of tax in the two polar inequality views – the absolute and the 
relative. By definition, Δ𝑊 = 𝑁(𝛼) for an 𝛼-neutral tax. Consider first the absolute view. Raising one dollar 
on average in an absolutely neutral way requires taking one dollar from everyone, which increases the Gini 
coefficient. Thus, the post-tax social welfare, 𝑊𝑦 = 𝜇𝑦(1 − 𝐺𝑦) is lower than the pre-tax welfare, 𝑊𝑥 =
𝜇𝑥(1 − 𝐺𝑥), due to both 𝜇𝑦 < 𝜇𝑥 (as 𝜇𝑡 = 𝜇𝑦 − 𝜇𝑥 > 0) and 𝐺𝑦 > 𝐺𝑥. Now consider the relative view. Rais-
ing one dollar on average in a relatively neutral way requires taking the same proportion of everyone's pre-
tax income, under the constraint that the average tax liability equals one dollar. Since this tax takes the same 
 
21 For a proof, see section A.4 in Appendix. 
22 For a proof, see section A.5 in Appendix. 
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proportion of everyone's pre-tax income, the Gini coefficient remains unchanged, and the post-tax welfare 
is lower than the pre-tax welfare only due to 𝜇𝑦 < 𝜇𝑥. Since the average tax liability is the same in both 
cases, a larger loss is caused by the absolutely neutral tax (for which 𝐺𝑦 > 𝐺𝑥) than by the relatively neutral 
tax (for which 𝐺𝑦 = 𝐺𝑥).  
To understand why 𝑃 (𝛼) decreases with 𝛼, note that the condition for 𝛼-progressivity (𝛼-regressiv-
ity), 𝑃 (𝛼) = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥 > 0 (𝑃 (𝛼) = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥 < 0) is more difficult (easy) to satisfy the larger the 𝛼 (all 
else equal). This is best seen by comparing the polar inequality views: absolute progressivity is less de-
manding than relative progressivity. This is because for absolute progressivity it suffices that tax is concen-
trated among the relatively rich (𝐷𝑡 > 0), while relative progressivity in addition requires tax to be more 
concentrated than pre-tax income (𝐷𝑡 − 𝐺𝑥 > 0). Therefore, absolute progressivity (regressivity) is neces-
sary (sufficient), but not sufficient (necessary), for relative progressivity (regressivity). In general, if a tax 
is progressive (regressive) for 𝛼 = ?̃?, then it is progressive (regressive) for any smaller (larger) 𝛼 too (Urban 
2019). 
Whether the absolute value of 𝑃 (𝛼) increases or decreases upon an increase in 𝛼, depends on the 
sign of 𝑃 (𝛼). If 𝑃 (𝛼) > 0 (𝑃 (𝛼) < 0), i.e., if the tax is 𝛼-progressive (𝛼-regressive), an increase in 𝛼 reduces 
(increases) its absolute value, meaning that the welfare-increasing (welfare-reducing) impact of 𝛼-progres-
sivity (𝛼-regressivity) becomes smaller (larger). 
It should be stressed that claims such as “By increasing 𝛼, 𝑃 (𝛼) decreases, meaning that the tax 
becomes less progressive (or more regressive)” are senseless. The reason is that to change 𝛼 means to 
change the inequality view, and thus the standard of neutrality, and in turn the definition of progressivity. 
And here we are not referring only to situations such as case 3 in section 3.1 (0 < 𝐷𝑡 < 𝐺𝑥), where the tax 
is progressive for 𝛼’s up to some value, and regressive for those beyond it (an example is the value added 
tax). Rather, comparing the extent of tax progressivity for different 𝛼 is senseless even if the tax in question 
is progressive or regressive for all 𝛼. Comparisons of the extent of progressivity make sense only for a given 
𝛼, i.e., for a given standard of neutrality implied by a specific inequality view. Thus, a claim that makes 
sense would be: “Tax A is more 𝛼-progressive than tax B.” 
While Δ𝑊  remains unchanged as 𝛼 varies, its composition does change. Precisely, the relative sizes 
of 𝑃 (𝛼) and 𝑁(𝛼) vary with 𝛼 in a certain manner. To see that, it is useful to divide both sides of equation 
(18a) by the absolute value of 𝑁(𝛼): 
Δ𝑊|𝑁(𝛼)|⏟
≔ 𝛿(𝛼)








The term on the left-hand side, 𝛿(𝛼), is the actual welfare loss expressed relative to the welfare loss 
that would obtain if the tax were 𝛼-neutral. When the actual tax is 𝛼-neutral, 𝛿(𝛼) equals –1. When the actual 
tax is not 𝛼-neutral, 𝛿(𝛼) is larger or smaller than –1, depending on the signs of 𝑃 (𝛼) and 𝐻 . Recall that 
𝐻 = 0 if there is no reranking, and 𝐻 < 0 if there is reranking, so that 𝜂(𝛼) ≤ 0. Thus, reranking increases 
the actual welfare loss above the level that would obtain if the tax were 𝛼-neutral. 𝑃 (𝛼), and consequently 
𝜋(𝛼), is positive (negative) (zero) if the tax is 𝛼-progressive (𝛼-regressive) (𝛼-neutral). Therefore, an 𝛼-
progressive (𝛼-regressive) tax reduces (increases) the actual welfare loss relative to the loss that would pre-
vail if the tax were 𝛼-neutral. A positive 𝜋(𝛼) can be interpreted as measuring the fraction of the welfare 
loss on account of 𝑁(𝛼) that is offset by the welfare gain arising from 𝛼-progressivity. Likewise, one can 
interpret a negative 𝜋(𝛼) as measuring how much an 𝛼-regressive tax contributes to the welfare loss on top 
of 𝑁(𝛼), expressed as a share of 𝑁(𝛼). 
𝛿(𝛼), 𝜋(𝛼), and 𝜂(𝛼) all depend on inequality view, and thus change with 𝛼. As can be seen from 
(19), the change in 𝛿(𝛼) upon an increase in 𝛼 is the sum of changes in 𝜋(𝛼) and 𝜂(𝛼). 𝜋(𝛼) is decreasing in 
𝛼, except in a practically irrelevant case where there is only one taxpayer (𝐷𝑡 = 1), the person with the 
highest pre-tax income.23 This, however, does not mean that 𝑃 (𝛼) relative to 𝑁(𝛼) is monotonically falling 
as one moves from the absolute towards the relative inequality view. For the values of 𝛼 for which the tax 
is progressive (i.e., 𝛼 ∈ [0, 𝛼)̃, where 𝛼̃ ≔ 𝐷𝑡/𝐺𝑥), increasing 𝛼 reduces the relative size of 𝑃 (𝛼). On the 
contrary, for the value of 𝛼 for which the tax is neutral (i.e., 𝛼 = 𝛼)̃ and for those for which the tax is regres-
sive (i.e., 𝛼 ∈ (𝛼,̃ 1]) higher values, increasing 𝛼 increases the relative size of 𝑃 (𝛼).  
𝜂(𝛼) is decreasing in 𝛼 too, except if there is no reranking (i.e., except if 𝐻 = 0).24 When 𝐻 ≠ 0, 
the fall in 𝜂(𝛼) when 𝛼 increases is proportional to 𝐻 . Real-world taxes typically cause relatively little 
reranking once we take account of differences in needs among households through adjusting pre-tax in-
comes using a household equivalent scale. Thus, typically, 𝛿(𝛼) will be predominantly determined by 𝜋(𝛼), 
rather than 𝜂(𝛼).  
Figure 1 plots 𝜋(𝛼) against 𝛼 for five hypothetical taxes, corresponding to the five cases discussed 
in section 3.1. The figures are specific to the S-Gini parameter 𝜌 = 2, associated with the Sen SWF (Sen 
1974) and the standard Gini and concentration coefficients. In each case, there is very little or no reranking 
(𝐻 ≈ 0 or 𝐻 = 0, respectively).25 In cases 1 and 2, showing taxes which are progressive for all 𝛼 (except 
for 𝛼 = 1, in case 2), increasing alpha reduces 𝜋(𝛼) and brings it closer to zero, which amounts to reducing 
the relative size of 𝑃 (𝛼) > 0. For example, in case 2, 𝜋(𝛼) falls from 𝜋(0) = 0.36, to 𝜋(0.5) = 0.22, to 𝜋(1) = 
 
23 For a proof, see section A.6 in Appendix. 
24 For a proof, see section A.7 in Appendix. 
25 Precisely, 𝐻 = 0 in cases 2, 3, and 4, as in each case the tax is 𝛼-neutral for an 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] (see above where we stated 
that an 𝛼-neutral tax cannot cause reranking). And 𝐻 ≈ 0 in cases 1 and 5.   
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0. This means that according to the absolute inequality view, the progressivity of the tax offsets 36 percent 
of 𝑁(0), the welfare loss that would obtain if the tax were absolutely neutral (i.e., 0-neutral or uniform). 
The share of the welfare loss offset by progressivity is smaller, 22 percent, for the intermediate view located 
halfway between the polar views, corresponding to 𝛼 = 0.5. And for the relative view, as the tax is relatively 
neutral (proportional) (𝑃 (1) = 0), the welfare loss that would obtain if the tax were relatively neutral, 
namely 𝑁(1), is not offset at all (𝜋(1) = 0). 
On the contrary, in cases 4 and 5, the taxes are regressive for all 𝛼 (except for 𝛼 = 0, in case 4). 
Here, increasing 𝛼 decreases 𝜋(𝛼) and bring it farther from zero, which amounts to increasing the relative 
size of 𝑃 (𝛼) < 0. In case 4, for example, according to the absolute view, the tax is neutral, and thus does 
has no impact on welfare (𝜋(0) = 0). Yet, according to the intermediate view corresponding to 𝛼 = 0.5, the 
tax is regressive, and the regressivity contributes to the welfare loss on top of 𝑁(0.5), with the contribution 
amounting to 22 percent of 𝑁(0.5): 𝜋(0.5) = −0.22. The contribution of regressivity to the welfare loss 
rises further by getting closer to the relative view, where the contribution amounts to 55 percent of the loss 
𝑁(1): 𝜋(1) = −0.55. 
 
Figure 1: 𝜋(𝛼) across 𝛼 for five types of taxes 
 
Notes: 𝜋(𝛼) is defined in section 3.2. The five cases correspond to those discussed in section 3.1. 𝐷𝑡 – concentration index of tax; 𝐺𝑥 – Gini coefficient of pre-tax income. 


















Case 1: Dt > Gx
Case 2: Dt = Gx
Case 3: 0 < Dt < Gx
Case 4: Dt = 0
Case 5: Dt < 0
Dollars per one dollar of welfare loss if tax were α-neutral
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Case 3 is a mixed case: the tax is progressive for the values of 𝛼 up to 0.34, for which it is neutral, 
and regressive for all values of 𝛼 above this value. Thus, up to 𝛼 = 0.34, a higher 𝛼 is associated with a 
smaller fraction of the loss 𝑁(𝛼) being offset by the welfare-increasing impact of progressivity, as the rel-
ative size of 𝑃 (𝛼) > 0 falls. Beyond 𝛼 = 0.34, raising 𝛼 increases the relative size of 𝑃 (𝛼) < 0, increasing 
thus the welfare-reducing impact of regressivity. 
Equation (19) can be interpreted in another way as well. Let us call 𝜏 ≔ 𝜇𝑡/𝜇𝑥 the "overall ATR".26 
Now let us introduce what may be termed the "welfare equivalent overall ATR", denoted 𝜏∗(𝛼). It is defined 
as the overall ATR associated with the 𝛼-neutral tax that would cause the same welfare loss, 𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥, as 
the overall ATR associated with the actual tax (𝜏 = 𝜇𝑡/𝜇𝑥). Formally, 𝜏∗(𝛼) satisfies27   
𝜏𝜏∗(𝛼) = 1−𝛿(𝛼) = 11 − 𝜋(𝛼) − 𝜂(𝛼) . (20) 
According to (20), for a given welfare loss, the more (less) 𝛼-progressive the actual tax is, and the 
less (more) reranking it causes, the higher (lower) the actual overall ATR may be relative to the overall ATR 
associated with the 𝛼-neutral tax. In other words, for a fixed loss of social welfare that the government is 
willing to impose on the society, it can tax away a higher (lower) fraction of pre-tax income the more (less) 
progressive the tax is and the less (more) reranking takes place. Since 𝜏∗(𝛼) depends on 𝛼, the ratio 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) 
does, too. As noted above, both 𝜋(𝛼) and 𝜂(𝛼) are decreasing in 𝛼, so that 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) is decreasing in 𝛼. Hence, 
for a given welfare loss, as we are increasing 𝛼 the fraction of aggregate pre-tax income that is actually 
taxed away becomes smaller relative to the fraction that would be taxed away if the tax were neutral. Note 
that, since 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) = 𝜇𝑡/𝜇𝑡∗(𝛼), the previous sentence is equivalent to this one: For a given loss, as we are 
increasing 𝛼 the actual average tax liability becomes smaller relative to the average tax liability that would 
prevail if the tax were neutral. 
Figure 2 displays 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) = 𝜇𝑡/𝜇𝑡∗(𝛼) for the five cases considered in figure 1. Clearly, the more 
progressive the tax, the larger the 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) ratio. Consider case 1, where the tax is more progressive than in 
the other cases for any inequality view. For the absolute view, 𝜏 is almost four times larger than 𝜏∗(0), 
meaning that, if the progressive tax were replaced by the absolutely neutral tax that causes the same welfare 
loss, the average tax liability (and the total revenue from this tax) would have to be just (1/4) 100% = 25% 
of the actual. This percentage rises as we move from the absolute towards the relative view. For the relative 
view, if the actual tax were replaced by the relatively neutral tax equivalent to the actual in terms of the 
welfare loss, the implied average tax liability would amount to about (1/2.5) 100% = 40% of the actual 
figure. As another example, take case 4, where the tax is absolutely neutral, and regressive for all other 
 
26 Here “overall” signifies that that 𝜏  is the ATR pertaining to the entire distribution, rather the ATR specific to a 
particular level of pre-tax income, 𝜏(𝑥) = 𝑡(𝑥)/𝑥.  
27 For a proof, see section A.8 in Appendix. 
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inequality views. Thus, except for the absolute view, where 𝜏/𝜏∗(0) = 1, for all other views we have 
𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) < 1, meaning that for any inequality view but the absolute (𝛼 = 0) one can, holding the welfare loss 
unchanged, replace the actual (regressive) tax with the neutral tax that collects more revenue. 
 
Figure 2: 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) across 𝛼 for five types of taxes 
 
Notes: 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) is defined in section 3.2. The five cases correspond to those discussed in section 3.1. 𝐷𝑡 – concentration index of tax; 𝐺𝑥 – Gini coefficient of pre-tax income. 
Source: Authors' elaboration. 
 
At the beginning of section 3, we stated that all the analytical results hold equally for any admissible 
value of 𝜌, the single parameter of the S-Gini class of SWF. Here we just emphasise that, while the analytical 
results do not depend on 𝜌, the empirical results in concrete applications do in general depend on the pa-
rameter, as the values of the SWF's (𝑊𝑥, 𝑊𝑦, 𝛹𝑦, 𝛹𝑡, 𝛺𝛼), and the Gini and concentration coefficients (𝐺𝑥, 
𝐺𝑦, 𝐷𝑦, 𝐷𝑡) are all 𝜌-specific. Thus, for instance, the inequality view for which a given tax is neutral, char-
acterised by 𝛼 = ?̃? ≔ 𝐷𝑡/𝐺𝑥, depends on 𝜌 since 𝐷𝑡 and 𝐺𝑥 do so. And similarly for other quantities ap-
pearing within the framework. So, for a 𝜌 other than 𝜌 = 2 that we have chosen, figures 1 and 2 would be 
quantitatively different. However, how much the figures would change for another 𝜌 must be checked by 
concrete calculation, as the extent of change depends on the distribution of pre-tax income 𝑥 and the tax 
function 𝑡(𝑥). For this reason, it is difficult to ascertain analytically how much the elements of equation 
(18a) would change upon a change in 𝜌. We conjecture that to derive analytical results, one would need to 
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4   An application: tax progressivity and social welfare in Croatia 
In this section, we apply the analytical framework developed in the preceding section to assess the welfare 
impact of taxation in Croatia in the year 2017. 
 
4.1   The taxes, method, data, and definitions 
We consider three taxes or, rather, three groups of taxes. The first group, which we refer to as “personal 
income tax” (PIT) includes the personal income tax and a related surtax. The Croatian personal income tax 
is levied on income from diverse sources, namely wage employment, self-employment, contractual work, 
rental and capital income, and pensions. In general, social benefits are not taxed. The tax base is gross 
income lowered by a basic personal allowance and a supplemental allowance for dependent family mem-
bers. In the case of wage employment income, the amount of employee’s social insurance contributions acts 
as a deduction. There is a general schedule and income source-specific schedules. The general schedule is 
used to tax, on a yearly basis, wage employment income, self-employment income, income from contractual 
work and pensions. This schedule consists of two bands: the lower band with a rate of 24 percent, and the 
higher band with a rate of 36 percent. For pensioners, the tax obligation amounts to 50 percent of the com-
puted amount. The source-specific schedules are applied to rental and capital income, with a flat rate of 12 
percent. The PIT obligation is the base for the surtax, which is paid at a rate set by the authorities at the level 
of towns and municipalities, with statutory restrictions on the maximum rate:28 10 percent for municipalities; 
12 (15) percent for towns with a population below (above) 30 thousand.29 
The second group of taxes, “social insurance contributions” (SIC), consists of the contributions for 
general health, occupational health, employment, and pension insurance. SIC are paid on income from em-
ployment, self-employment, and contractual work. In the case of self-employment income, SIC are paid as 
a lump sum, depending on type of self-employment, while for the other income types, the base is equal to 
gross income. The rates vary by type of SIC: 15 percent for the general health contribution; 0.5 percent for 
the occupational health contribution; 1.7 for employment contribution; and 20 percent for the pension in-
surance contributions.30 Pensioners with a gross monthly pension exceeding the average national net 
monthly wage pay the special pensioner health contribution, whose rate is 3 percent.31  
 
28 There are no restrictions on the minimum rate. About half of all towns and municipalities have a zero surtax rate. 
29 The only exception is Zagreb, the capital, where the maximum allowed is 30 percent. 
30 Income from contractual work is subject to the general health and pension contributions only. 
31 For pensioners with gross monthly pension below the average national net monthly wage, the contribution rate is 1 
percent, but the contribution is paid from the central government budget (CGB). CGB pays various contributions for 
other social groups as well, such as unemployed and persons on maternity/parental leave. However, neither of these 
CGB-financed contributions is included in our analysis. 
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 The third group of taxes are indirect taxes (IND), namely the value added tax (VAT) and excises. 
The set of VAT rates includes the standard rate of 25 percent and two reduced rates of 5 and 13 percent. 
The 5 percent rate applies to basic food items such as bread and milk, medical drugs, and various merit 
goods such as books, newspapers, or cinema tickets. The rate of 13 percent applies to food items such as 
edible oils and fats, electricity, water supply, refuse collection, and services of the hospitality industry in-
cluding bars, restaurants, and accommodation facilities. Services such as medical, educational, and finan-
cial, are exempt from VAT.32 Excises are levied on electricity, oil products, alcoholic beverages, coffee and 
some other non-alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products.33 In addition to the three groups of taxes, we 
also consider their combination (i.e., PIT + SIC + IND). 
The taxes are simulated using EUROMOD, a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European 
Union countries (Sutherland and Figari 2013).34 Applying the rules of a country’s system of taxes and social 
benefits to the EU-SILC35 household survey data, the model simulates the amounts of taxes and social ben-
efits that each household pays and receives, respectively. Here we use the Croatian component of EURO-
MOD (Urban, Bezeredi, and Pezer 2020).   
As yet, the Croatian component of EUROMOD does not include the tool that allows for simulation 
of indirect taxes. To be able to simulate indirect taxes, we extend the default model by adding an indirect 
tax module, which is built following the Indirect Tax Tool version 2 (De Agostini et al. 2017).36 To simulate 
indirect taxes we need for each household the information on consumption expenditures, and since the EU-
SILC does not collect this information, it must be imputed from another survey. For that purpose, we use 
the Croatian Household Budget Survey for 2017, and impute consumption from it into the EU-SILC, fol-
lowing a parametric survey-to-survey imputation method set forth by De Agostini et al. (2017).37 
To address the common issue of survey data not representing well incomes at the top of the distri-
bution38, the EU-SILC original incomes are corrected using a recent survey calibration method (Blanchet et 
al. 2019). The method makes the survey income distribution in line with the income distribution recorded 
in administrative data of the tax authority, which is deemed fully representative at the top. This is done 
 
32 We assume that pre-VAT prices are not affected by VAT, and thus treat the exempt services as zero-rated. Conse-
quently, the possible cascading effects of the VAT paid on inputs in the production of the exempt services are not 
captured.   
33 Only the direct effects of excises are taken into account. For example, in the case of oil products or electricity, it is 
assumed that individuals pay the respective excises only through their direct consumption of oil products (as car fuel, 
for example) and electricity (in the household), but not indirectly through the consumption of goods and services 
produced using oil products or electricity as inputs. 
34 See also the EUROMOD website: https://euromod-web.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview/what-is-euromod.  
35 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. 
36 Currently, there are two versions of the Indirect Tax Tool: ITT version 2 (De Agostini et al. 2017) and ITT version 
3 (Acoğuz et al. 2020).  
37 See also Decoster, Ochmann, and Spiritus (2013; 2014). 
38 For a review, see Lustig (2019). 
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through a two-step procedure. In the first step, a data-driven algorithm determines the income level beyond 
which the survey income distribution is unrepresentative of the true distribution due to undercoverage of 
top incomes. The second step includes amending the survey weights attached to each interviewed house-
hold: households with top income earners are thus reweighted upward, while the rest are reweighted down-
ward. At the same time, the survey remains representative of the underlying population in terms of demo-
graphic variables such as gender and age.39 This enables us to capture more tax revenue, which would oth-
erwise not be captured due to undercoverage of individuals with top incomes in the original survey data. 
Most notably, with the corrected data, we are able to simulate about 10 percent more revenue from personal 
income tax, getting thus closer to the total revenue actually raised.40  
Before turning to the results, let us define the empirical counterparts of the theoretical concepts 
referred to in sections 2 and 3. Pre-tax income is the sum of gross (i.e., pre-PIT-and-SIC) income from all 
sources (wage employment, self-employment, financial assets, real property) and all social benefits re-
ceived. Post-tax income depends on which tax is considered; thus, we have post-PIT income (pre-tax income 
minus PIT), post-SIC income (pre-tax income minus SIC), post-IND income (pre-tax income minus IND), 
and post-PIT-and-SIC-and-IND income (pre-tax income minus PIT minus SIC minus IND). The unit of 
analysis is an individual, assuming equal sharing among household members. All incomes and taxes are 
aggregated at the household level and then normalised by the OECD-modified41 equivalence scale. So, 
whenever individuals are sorted by income (either pre- or post-tax), they are sorted by the equivalised house-
hold income. 
 
4.2   The welfare impact of tax progressivity 
We first describe the taxes in terms of how the ATR and the tax liability vary with pre-tax income. Figure 
3 displays the amount of tax on panel A, and the ATR on panel B. Personal income tax (PIT) and social 
insurance contributions (SIC) are similar in the sense that for both the ATR and the tax liability tend to 
 
39 See Blanchet et al. (2019) for more details. Alternatively, a three-step procedure can also be applied, wherein the 
first two steps are as described above. In the third step certain number of synthetic observations, with incomes higher 
than the maximum income observed in the survey, are added to the survey, and the weights (the new ones from the 
second step) are uniformly downscaled so that the weights add up to the population. This, last step, can be interpreted 
as artificial oversampling of households with high-income individuals to overcome biases arising from insufficient 
sample size. 
40 More precisely, in the case of PIT from the sources subject to the general schedule (see above), we are able to close 
virtually the entire shortfall of the simulated aggregate amount from the amount recorded in administrative fiscal sta-
tistics as the actual collection. Considering the whole PIT (i.e., from all sources), a 10-percent shortfall still remains, 
however. This is due entirely to the fact that, for lack of information, we were not able to properly address the issue of 
undercoverage of top capital incomes, which are subject to a specific schedule (see above). Namely, while tax authority 
produces tabulations on distributions of employment, self-employment and pension income (which were all used in 
calibration), similar tabulations on capital income are not available.  
41 Number of adult equivalents according to the OECD-modified scale = 1 + 0.5×(number of adults – 1) + 0.3×number 
of children. Adults are persons aged 14 or more. 
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increase with pre-tax income. Thus, both are examples of case 1 in section 3.1. This is confirmed by the 
values of their concentration coefficients in table 1, which are both larger than the Gini coefficient of pre-
tax income, and therefore both taxes are progressive for all inequality views in the continuum from the 
absolute to the relative. 
Unlike for PIT and SIC, in the case of indirect taxes (IND) the ATR decreases with pre-tax income, 
whereas the amount of tax, just like in the cases of PIT and SIC, increases with pre-tax income. Therefore, 
IND is an example of case 3, with a concentration coefficient which is positive and smaller than the Gini 
coefficient of pre-tax income, implying progressivity for all inequality views from the absolute to the one 
characterised by 𝛼0 = 0.489 (for which IND are neutral), and regressivity for all inequality views beyond it, 
all the way to the relative view. 
When we combine PIT, SIC, and IND together, the tax-liability curve and the ATR curve are each 
obtained by adding up (vertically) the corresponding curves pertaining to PIT, SIC, and IND. While the 
resulting tax-liability curve is monotonically increasing as the other three, the ATR curve for the combined 
tax is J-shaped, where the downward-sloping part at the bottom of the pre-tax income distribution is entirely 
due to the poorest paying only IND, as they have non-zero consumption, but no income subject to PIT and 
SIC. Moving away from the very bottom, the ATR starts increasing, as PIT and SIC outweigh IND. Conse-
quently, the concentration coefficient of the combined tax exceeds the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income, 
implying that the combined tax is progressive for any inequality view in the continuum from the absolute 
to the relative view. 
In figure 4, we apply (18a)–(18e) to decompose the total welfare impacts of PIT, SIC, IND, and the 
combined tax (PIT + SIC + IND) into the 𝛼-neutral-tax effect, the 𝛼-progressivity effect, and the horizontal 
effect.42 All the results are for the S-Gini parameter 𝜌 = 2. Note first that the 𝛼-neutral-tax effect, 𝑁(𝛼), is 
the same across the three taxes for a given inequality view. This is because, for a given 𝛼, it depends on the 
pre-tax income inequality, 𝐺𝑥, only. In addition, note that the taxes cause only a little reranking. Precisely, 
the horizontal effect, 𝐻 , as a share of the welfare loss per one kuna of tax revenue, Δ𝑊 , equals 2.4, 3.2, 
0.2, and 2 percent in the case of PIT, SIC, IND, and PIT + SIC + IND, respectively. Therefore, Δ𝑊  across 





   
 




Figure 3: The average tax rate and the amount of tax across the distribution of pre-tax income 
 
Notes: For descriptions of the taxes, see section 4.1. Each curve is obtained by smoothing the values on the ordinate using the 
LOWESS smoother with the default bandwidth size of 0.8. To prevent influential observations from the top and the bottom of the 
pre-tax income distribution from affecting the shape of the curves, the top and bottom 0.1 percent of observations were excluded 
before the smoothing. Pre-tax income and the tax liability are equivalized using the OECD-modified equivalence scale. 
Source: Authors' estimates based on the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD and the EU-SILC 2017 data. 
 




coefficient of tax 
Gini coefficient 
of pre-tax income 
Personal income tax (PIT) 0.752 0.356 
Social insurance contributions (SIC) 0.468 0.356 
Indirect taxes (IND) 0.174 0.356 
PIT + SIC + IND 0.405 0.356 
Notes: For descriptions of the taxes, see section 4.1. The taxes and pre-fiscal income are equivalized using the OECD-modified 
equivalent scale. 
Source: Authors' estimates based on the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD and the EU-SILC 2017 data.  
 
Of the three taxes, PIT causes the smallest welfare loss per unit of tax collected, 0.25 kuna (i.e., 
Δ𝑊 = −0.25) (panel A). This means that each kuna of the PIT revenue, when spent, must yield a return of 
0.25 kuna – a 25-percent return – for the government to just break even in terms of social welfare. More 
than twice higher return of 0.55 kuna is required per unit of the SIC revenue for the government to break 
even (panel B). This is due to lower progressivity of SIC compared to PIT, for all inequality views, as 
measured by 𝑃 (𝛼), which is equal to the generalised Kakwani index of Urban (2019). When it comes to 
IND, the required break-even return is even higher, 0.83 kuna per one kuna of the IND revenue, as it is less 
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progressive than both PIT and SIC for 𝛼 < 0.5, it is neutral for 𝛼 = 0.5, and regressive for all 𝛼 > 0 (panel 
C). Unlike progressivity, regressivity increases the welfare loss per unit of IND above 𝑁(𝛼), the loss that 
would obtain if IND were neutral. When PIT, SIC, and IND are considered together, the combined tax is 
progressive for all 𝛼 (panel D), coming close to neutrality for the relative inequality view. The decomposi-
tion is similar to that for SIC, with a bit smaller positive 𝑃 (𝛼) for all 𝛼, and hence a bit larger welfare loss 
per unit of tax revenue: 0.61 kuna (i.e., Δ𝑊 = −0.61). 
In figure 5 we plot 𝜋(𝛼) against 𝛼 for the four taxes.43 Again, the results are for 𝜌 = 2. PIT and SIC 
are both progressive for any inequality view, with PIT being considerably more progressive. The welfare-
increasing impact of PIT's progressivity, as measured by 𝑃 (𝛼), offsets no less than 60 percent of the welfare 
loss that would obtain if PIT were neutral: for the absolute view, 𝑃 (0) offsets three quarters of the loss 𝑁(0) 
(𝜋(0) = 0.751), a bit short of 70 percent for 𝛼 = 0.5 (𝜋(0.5) = 0.697), and a little more than 60 percent for 
the relative view (𝛼(1) = 0.614). Substantially smaller are the corresponding figures for SIC, namely 𝜋(0) =
0.467, 𝜋(0.5) = 0.351, and 𝜋(1) = 0.172, due to lower progressivity of SIC for any inequality view. 
Unlike PIT and SIC, IND is progressive for nearly the half of inequality views that are closer to the 
absolute view (𝛼 < 0.489), neutral for 𝛼 = 0.489, and regressive for about the half of inequality views closer 
to the relative view (𝛼 > 0.489). Where progressive, IND is much less progressive than PIT and SIC, with 
at most 17 percent of the neutral-tax effect being offset by the progressivity effect (𝜋(0) = 0.174). And 
where regressive, the contribution of IND to the welfare loss on top of the welfare-reducing neutral-tax 
effect reaches up to 28 percent of the neutral-tax effect (𝜋(1) = −0.283). 
Despite this regressivity of IND for a subset of inequality views, the tax combining PIT, SIC, and 
IND into one (PIT + SIC + IND) remains progressive over the whole continuum of inequality views, just 
like PIT and SIC, but less than the latter two. Its progressivity is of a magnitude enough to offset 40 percent 
of the neutral-tax effect for the absolute view (𝜋(0) = 0.405), about 28 percent for the intermediate view 
associated with  𝛼 = 0.5, while for the relative view the figure falls to about 7 percent (𝜋(1) = 0.075). 
Figure 6 displays the ratio 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼).44 PIT, being the most progressive, exhibits substantially higher 
ratio than the other taxes. For the absolute view, PIT's progressivity allows the actual revenue to be 3.9 times 
higher than if the tax were absolutely neutral (i.e., uniform), while causing the same welfare loss. The ratio 
falls to 3.2 for the intermediate view 𝛼 = 0.5 and to 2.5 for the relative view. For SIC, progressive for all 
inequality views too, the progressivity also allows the actual revenue to be larger than in the case of welfare-
loss-equivalent neutrality: about 80, 50, and 17 percent for 𝛼 = 0, 𝛼 = 0.5, and 𝛼 = 1, respectively (i.e., 
𝜏/𝜏∗(0) = 1.82, 𝜏/𝜏∗(0.5) = 1.49, 𝜏/𝜏∗(1) = 1.17). In the case of IND, its progressivity for the absolute view 
 
43 The values on which the figure is based are given in table A1 in section A.9 in Appendix. 
44 The values on which the figure is based are given in table A1 in section A.9 in Appendix. 
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is such that the actual revenue exceeds by about 20 percent the revenue that would obtain if IND were 
neutral and caused the same welfare loss. This percentage falls practically to zero for the intermediate view 
𝛼 = 0.5, while for the relative view, for which IND is regressive, the actual revenue falls 22 percent short 
of the revenue that would be possible to collect with the relatively neutral tax causing equal welfare loss. 
Finally, for the combined tax, PIT + SIC + IND, the ratio is, due to progressivity, above 1 for all inequality 
views, but comes close to 1 for the relative view: 𝜏/𝜏∗(0) = 1.65, 𝜏/𝜏∗(0.5) = 1.35, 𝜏/𝜏∗(1) = 1.06. 
 
Figure 4: Decomposition of the welfare impact of personal income tax, social insurance contributions, 
and indirect taxes 
 
Notes: For descriptions of the taxes, see section 4.1. The decomposition is according to (18a–e). 






Figure 5: 𝜋(𝛼) across 𝛼 for personal income tax, social insurance contributions, and indirect taxes in Cro-
atia, in 2017 
 
Notes: For descriptions of the taxes, see section 4.1. 𝜋(𝛼) is defined in section 3.2. 
Source: Authors' estimates based on the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD and the EU-SILC 2017 data.  
 
Figure 6: 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) across 𝛼 for personal income tax, social insurance contributions, and indirect taxes in 
Croatia, in 2017 
 
Notes: 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) is defined in section 3.2. For descriptions of the taxes, see section 4.1. 
Source: Authors' estimates based on the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD and the EU-SILC 2017 data.  
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In sum, the results indicate that the Croatian tax system is overall progressive. While PIT and SIC 
are progressive for all inequality views – with PIT being considerably more progressive – IND is progressive 
for about half of inequality views, namely those from the absolute view to approximately the intermediate 
view associated with 𝛼 = 0.5. If the Croatian tax system were neutral instead, and collected the same reve-
nue, a larger welfare loss associated with taxation would have to be incurred. Also, replacing the actual, 
overall progressive tax system by the neutral system, subject to the constraint that the welfare loss remains 
the same as with the actual taxes, the revenue would have to be lower. Most importantly, the exact magni-
tudes depend on the inequality view taken, with notable differences not only between the figures pertaining 
to the relative and absolute views as the polar views, but also between the figures for more similar views. 
 
5   Conclusion 
If we accept that no feature of a public policy should be promoted as an end in itself, but rather as a means 
to increase a measure of social welfare, features of tax policy design should also be assessed in terms of the 
impact of taxes on social welfare. Thus, tax progressivity/regressivity, as a feature of tax design, should 
accordingly be evaluated considering its social welfare impact. This, however, has not traditionally been the 
case, as the standard approach to tax progressivity measurement, based on the Kakwani index of progres-
sivity (Kakwani 1977), was not explicitly embedded in a social welfare framework and interpreted accord-
ingly. 
In a recent contribution, Kakwani and Son (2021) have developed a framework allowing for the 
decomposition of the social welfare loss due to taxation into a few constitutive elements, one of which 
pertains to tax progressivity/regressivity. Recognising that there are different views of inequality, they have 
provided the framework in two versions: one based on the relative inequality view, the other one on the 
absolute view. 
In this paper, we have gone a step further, recognising that besides the absolute and relative ine-
quality views as the polar cases there are many intermediate inequality views, namely a whole continuum 
ranging from the absolute to the relative view. We have generalised the Kakwani and Son (2021) framework 
by providing it in a form which nests the absolute and relative inequality views, as well as the whole con-
tinuum of intermediate views between them, as special cases. In the generalisation, we have made use of 
Urban's (2019) generalisation of the Kakwani index accommodating intermediate inequality views, where 
the underlying approach to intermediate inequality is based on the concept of 𝛼-inequality (Bosmans et al. 
2014; del Río and Ruiz-Castillo 2000, 2001). 
We have shown that the generalised decomposition of tax-induced welfare change can be expressed 




with the respective weights equal to 𝛼 and 1 − 𝛼. While the size of the welfare loss does not depend on 
inequality view, we find that its composition does. The relative importance of tax progressivity/regressivity 
varies with inequality view. Precisely, for a progressive tax, increasing 𝛼, which amounts to getting closer 
to the relative inequality view, reduces the relative importance of progressivity; conversely, for a regressive 
tax, getting closer to the relative view increases the relative importance of regressivity. Thus, the perception 
of the composition of a given tax-induced welfare loss varies with the inequality view taken. 
In an empirical application examining the main taxes in Croatia, we have shown that it matters 
substantially which inequality view is taken in assessing the impact of taxation on social welfare. Overall, 
the Croatian tax system is progressive, and if it were neutral instead, the same amount of tax revenue would 
be possible to collect only at the cost of a larger welfare loss, the more so the closer the inequality view to 
the absolute view. Interpreted in a different way, if the actual, progressive tax system were replaced by the 
neutral system that causes the same welfare loss, the amount of tax revenue collected would have to be 
smaller, the more so the closer the inequality view to the absolute view. The progressivity of the overall tax 
system is due to the progressivity of personal income tax and social insurance contributions, which are 
progressive across all inequality views. Indirect taxes are progressive for approximately the half of inequal-
ity views closer to the absolute view, and regressive for the half of views closer to the relative view. How-
ever, the regressivity of indirect taxes for the subset of inequality views is not strong enough to render the 
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Here we prove that 𝐷𝑡𝛼 = 𝛼𝐺𝑥.  
By analogy with (7b) in section 2.1, 𝐷𝑡𝛼  is given by 
𝐷𝑡𝛼 = 1 − 𝛹𝑡𝛼𝜇𝑡𝛼 , (A1) 
where 
𝛹𝑡𝛼 = ∫ 𝑡𝛼(𝑥)𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)
∞
0 𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥 = ∫ [𝛼𝜏𝑥 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜏𝜇𝑥]𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)
∞
0 𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥 = 









= 𝛼𝜏𝑊𝑥 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜏𝜇𝑥. (A2) 
Plugging (A2) into (A1) and using the fact that 𝜇𝑡𝛼 = 𝜇𝑡, we get 
𝐷𝑡𝛼 = 1 − 𝛼𝜏𝑊𝑥 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜏𝜇𝑥𝜇𝑡𝛼 = 1 −
𝛼𝜏𝑊𝑥 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜏𝜇𝑥𝜇𝑡 = 1 −
𝛼𝜏𝑊𝑥 + 𝜏𝜇𝑥 − 𝛼𝜏𝜇𝑥𝜏𝜇𝑥 = 
= −𝛼𝜏𝑊𝑥 + 𝛼𝜏𝜇𝑥𝜏𝜇𝑥 = 𝛼 (1 −
𝑊𝑥𝜇𝑥 ) = 𝛼𝐺𝑥, (A3) 
where the last equality is due to (6a) in section 2.1. ■ 
 
A.2 
Here we prove that 
1𝜇𝑡 (Ω𝛼 − 𝑊𝑥) = −(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥), (A4) 1𝜇𝑡 (𝛹𝑦 − Ω𝛼) = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥, (A5) 1𝜇𝑡 (𝑊𝑦 − 𝛹𝑦) =
𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦). (A6) 
We first show that (A4) holds: 
1𝜇𝑡 (𝛺𝛼 − 𝑊𝑥) =
1𝜇𝑡 (∫ 𝑦𝛼(𝑥)𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 − ∫ 𝑥𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 ) = 
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= 1𝜇𝑡 (∫ [𝑥 − 𝑡𝛼(𝑥)]𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓 (𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 − ∫ 𝑥𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 ) = 
= − 1𝜇𝑡 ∫ 𝑡𝛼(𝑥)𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥 =
∞
0 −
1𝜇𝑡 𝛹𝑡𝛼 = −
1𝜇𝑡 𝜇𝑡𝛼(1 − 𝐷𝑡𝛼) = −(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥), (A7) 
where the last two equalities are due to equations (A1) and (A3), respectively. Next, we show that (A5) 
holds: 
1𝜇𝑡 (𝛹𝑦 − 𝛺𝛼) =
1𝜇𝑡 (∫ 𝑦(𝑥)𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 − ∫ 𝑦𝛼(𝑥)𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓 (𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 ) = 
= 1𝜇𝑡 ∫ [𝑦(𝑥) − (𝑥 − 𝑡𝛼(𝑥))]𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 = 
= 1𝜇𝑡 (− ∫ 𝑡(𝑥)𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 + ∫ 𝑡𝛼(𝑥)𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓 (𝑥)d𝑥
∞
0 ) = 
= 1𝜇𝑡 ∫ [−𝑡(𝑥) + 𝑡𝛼(𝑥)]𝜔(𝐹 (𝑥), 𝜌)𝑓(𝑥)d𝑥 =
∞
0
1𝜇𝑡 (−𝛹𝑡 + 𝛹𝑡𝛼) = 
= 1𝜇𝑡 [−𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜇𝑡𝛼(1 − 𝐷𝑡𝛼)] = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡𝛼 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥 (A8) 
where the last three equalities are due to equations (7b), (A1), (A3), and the fact that 𝜇𝑡𝛼 = 𝜇𝑡.  Finally, we 
show that (A6) holds: 
1𝜇𝑡 (𝑊𝑦 − 𝛹𝑦) =
1𝜇𝑡 [𝜇𝑦(1 − 𝐺𝑦) − 𝜇𝑦(1 − 𝐷𝑦)] =
𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦), (A9) 
where the first equality is due to equations (6b) and (7a). ■ 
 
A.3 
Here we prove that an 𝛼-neutral tax cannot cause reranking. 
Without loss of generality, consider any two individuals, called 𝐴 and 𝐵, with the pre-tax incomes 
𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 such that 𝑥𝐴 ≥ 𝑥𝐵. Suppose an 𝛼-neutral tax is levied, with the overall average tax rate 𝜏 and 
the mean tax liability 𝜇𝑡. Their respective post-tax incomes are: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛼𝜏𝑥𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝑡,   𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵. (A10) 
Now suppose that the tax reranks 𝐴 and 𝐵 so that 𝑦𝐴 < 𝑦𝐵. We have: 
𝑥𝐴 − 𝛼𝜏𝑥𝐴 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝑡 < 𝑥𝐵 − 𝛼𝜏𝑥𝐵 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝑡 (A11) 𝑥𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝜏) < 𝑥𝐵(1 − 𝛼𝜏) 𝑥𝐴 < 𝑥𝐵 





Here we prove that Δ𝑊 ≤ 0. 
Suppose the opposite holds: 
Δ𝑊 = 𝑁(𝛼) + 𝑃 (𝛼) + 𝐻 > 0 (A12) 
−(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) + (𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) + 𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦) > 0 
𝐷𝑡 − 1 + 𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦) > 0. (A13) 
By definition of the concentration coefficient, 𝐷𝑡 ∈ [−1,1]; thus, 𝐷𝑡 − 1 ≤ 0. K&S prove that 𝛹𝑦 ≥ 𝑊𝑦, 
which implies 𝐷𝑦 ≤ 𝐺𝑦; thus, 𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦) ≤ 0. Therefore, (A12) cannot hold. ■ 
 
A.5 
Here we prove that Δ𝑊 = 0 only if 𝐷𝑡 = 1 and 𝐻 = 0. 
Suppose that Δ𝑊 = 0. If so, then the left-hand size of (A13) is equal to zero: 
𝐷𝑡 − 1 + 𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦) = 0, (A14) 
which is true only if 𝐷𝑡 = 1 and 𝐻 ≔ 𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡 (𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦) = 0. ■  
 
A.6 
Here we prove that 𝜕𝜋(𝛼)/𝜕𝛼 < 0, except if 𝐷𝑡 = 1. 
𝜕𝜋(𝛼)𝜕𝛼 = 𝜕𝜕𝛼 ( 𝑃 (𝛼)|𝑁(𝛼)|) =
𝜕𝑃 (𝛼)𝜕𝛼 |𝑁(𝛼)| − 𝑃 (𝛼) 𝜕|𝑁(𝛼)|𝜕𝛼|𝑁(𝛼)|2 =
−𝐺𝑥|𝑁(𝛼)| − 𝑃 (𝛼) 𝑁(𝛼)|𝑁(𝛼)| 𝜕𝑁(𝛼)𝜕𝛼|𝑁(𝛼)|2 = 
= −𝐺𝑥|𝑁(𝛼)| − 𝑃 (𝛼)
𝑁(𝛼)|𝑁(𝛼)| 𝐺𝑥|𝑁(𝛼)|2  = −𝐺𝑥|𝑁(𝛼)| − 𝑃 (𝛼)(−1)𝐺𝑥|𝑁(𝛼)|2 = 𝐺𝑥(𝑃 (𝛼) − |𝑁(𝛼)|)|𝑁(𝛼)|2 = 
= 𝐺𝑥(𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥 − |−(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥)|)|𝑁(𝛼)|2 =
𝐺𝑥(𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥 − (1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥))|𝑁(𝛼)|2  = 𝐺𝑥(𝐷𝑡 − 1)|𝑁(𝛼)|2 . (A15) 
Assuming 𝐺𝑥 > 0, the derivative cannot be positive, as that would require 𝐷𝑡 > 1, which cannot be true 
because, by definition of the concentration coefficient, 𝐷𝑡 ∈ [−1,1]. The fraction can be either negative, 





Here we prove that 𝜕𝜂(𝛼)/𝜕𝛼 < 0, except if 𝐻 = 0. 
𝜕𝜂(𝛼)𝜕𝛼 = 𝜕𝜕𝛼 ( 𝐻|𝑁(𝛼)|) =
𝜕𝐻𝜕𝛼 |𝑁(𝛼)| − 𝐻 𝜕|𝑁(𝛼)|𝜕𝛼|𝑁(𝛼)|2 =
−𝐻 𝜕(1−𝛼𝐺𝑥)𝜕𝛼|𝑁(𝛼)|2 = −𝐻(−1)𝐺𝑥|𝑁(𝛼)|2 = 𝐻𝐺𝑥|𝑁(𝛼)|2 . (A16) 
Assuming, 𝐺𝑥 > 0, the derivative is negative if 𝐻 < 0, and zero if 𝐻 = 0. ■ 
 
A.8 
Here we prove that 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) = 1/(−𝛿(𝛼)). 
 Multiplying equation (18a) by 𝜇𝑡, we obtain 
𝜇𝑡Δ𝑊 = 𝜇𝑡𝑁(𝛼) + 𝜇𝑡𝑃 (𝛼) + 𝜇𝑡𝐻 (A17) 
𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥 = −𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) + 𝜇𝑡(𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) + 𝜇𝑦(𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦). 
The welfare loss 𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥 can as well be brought about by an 𝛼-neutral tax. By definition of 𝛼-neutral tax, 
this tax must be such that the average tax liability, 𝜇𝑡∗(𝛼), is implicitly given by 
𝑊𝑦 − 𝑊𝑥 = −𝜇𝑡∗(𝛼)(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥). (A18) 
Thus, combining (A17) and (A18), 
−𝜇𝑡∗(𝛼)(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) = −𝜇𝑡(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) + 𝜇𝑡(𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) + 𝜇𝑦(𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦). (A19) 




𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥−(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) +
𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑥
𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦−(1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥) = 𝜏 − 𝜏
𝐷𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥 − 𝜏
𝜇𝑦𝜇𝑡
𝐷𝑦 − 𝐺𝑦1 − 𝛼𝐺𝑥 = 
= 𝜏 − 𝜏 𝑃 (𝛼)|𝑁(𝛼)| − 𝜏 𝐻|𝑁(𝛼)| = 𝜏(1 − 𝜋(𝛼) − 𝜂(𝛼)) = −(−1 + 𝜋(𝛼) + 𝜂(𝛼))𝜏 = −𝛿(𝛼)𝜏. (A20) 
Denoting 𝜇𝑡∗(𝛼)/𝜇𝑥 ≡ 𝜏∗(𝛼), a straightforward reorganisation of (A20) gives (20). ■ 
 
A.9 







Table A1: Data for figures 4, 5, and 6 𝛼 Δ𝑊  𝑁(𝛼) 𝑃 (𝛼) 𝐻  𝛿(𝛼) 𝜋(𝛼) 𝜂(𝛼) 𝜏 𝜏∗(𝛼) 𝜏/𝜏∗(𝛼) 
Personal income tax (PIT) 
0 –0.255 –1.000 0.751 –0.006 –0.255 0.751 –0.006 0.045 0.011 3.920 
0.1 –0.255 –0.964 0.716 –0.006 –0.265 0.742 –0.007 0.045 0.012 3.780 
0.2 –0.255 –0.929 0.680 –0.006 –0.275 0.732 –0.007 0.045 0.012 3.641 
0.3 –0.255 –0.893 0.644 –0.006 –0.286 0.722 –0.007 0.045 0.013 3.501 
0.4 –0.255 –0.857 0.609 –0.006 –0.298 0.710 –0.007 0.045 0.013 3.361 
0.5 –0.255 –0.822 0.573 –0.006 –0.310 0.697 –0.008 0.045 0.014 3.222 
0.6 –0.255 –0.786 0.537 –0.006 –0.324 0.684 –0.008 0.045 0.015 3.082 
0.7 –0.255 –0.751 0.502 –0.006 –0.340 0.669 –0.009 0.045 0.015 2.942 
0.8 –0.255 –0.715 0.466 –0.006 –0.357 0.652 –0.009 0.045 0.016 2.803 
0.9 –0.255 –0.679 0.431 –0.006 –0.376 0.634 –0.009 0.045 0.017 2.663 
1 –0.255 –0.644 0.395 –0.006 –0.396 0.614 –0.010 0.045 0.018 2.523 
Social insurance contributions (SIC) 
0 –0.551 –1.000 0.467 –0.018 –0.551 0.467 –0.018 0.236 0.130 1.816 
0.1 –0.551 –0.964 0.432 –0.018 –0.571 0.447 –0.019 0.236 0.135 1.751 
0.2 –0.551 –0.929 0.396 –0.018 –0.593 0.426 –0.019 0.236 0.140 1.686 
0.3 –0.551 –0.893 0.360 –0.018 –0.617 0.403 –0.020 0.236 0.146 1.622 
0.4 –0.551 –0.857 0.325 –0.018 –0.642 0.379 –0.021 0.236 0.152 1.557 
0.5 –0.551 –0.822 0.289 –0.018 –0.670 0.352 –0.022 0.236 0.158 1.492 
0.6 –0.551 –0.786 0.253 –0.018 –0.701 0.322 –0.023 0.236 0.165 1.427 
0.7 –0.551 –0.751 0.218 –0.018 –0.734 0.290 –0.024 0.236 0.173 1.363 
0.8 –0.551 –0.715 0.182 –0.018 –0.770 0.255 –0.025 0.236 0.182 1.298 
0.9 –0.551 –0.679 0.146 –0.018 –0.811 0.216 –0.026 0.236 0.191 1.233 
1 –0.551 –0.644 0.111 –0.018 –0.856 0.172 –0.028 0.236 0.202 1.169 
Indirect taxes (IND) 
0 –0.827 –1.000 0.174 –0.002 –0.827 0.174 –0.002 0.131 0.109 1.209 
0.1 –0.827 –0.964 0.139 –0.002 –0.858 0.144 –0.002 0.131 0.113 1.165 
0.2 –0.827 –0.929 0.103 –0.002 –0.891 0.111 –0.002 0.131 0.117 1.122 
0.3 –0.827 –0.893 0.067 –0.002 –0.926 0.076 –0.002 0.131 0.122 1.079 
0.4 –0.827 –0.857 0.032 –0.002 –0.965 0.037 –0.002 0.131 0.127 1.036 
0.5 –0.827 –0.822 –0.004 –0.002 –1.007 –0.005 –0.002 0.131 0.132 0.993 
0.6 –0.827 –0.786 –0.039 –0.002 –1.052 –0.050 –0.002 0.131 0.138 0.950 
0.7 –0.827 –0.751 –0.075 –0.002 –1.102 –0.100 –0.002 0.131 0.145 0.907 
0.8 –0.827 –0.715 –0.111 –0.002 –1.157 –0.155 –0.003 0.131 0.152 0.864 
0.9 –0.827 –0.679 –0.146 –0.002 –1.218 –0.215 –0.003 0.131 0.160 0.821 
1 –0.827 –0.644 –0.182 –0.002 –1.286 –0.283 –0.003 0.131 0.169 0.778 
PIT + SIC + IND 
0 –0.608 –1.000 0.405 –0.012 –0.608 0.405 –0.012 0.412 0.250 1.646 
0.1 –0.608 –0.964 0.369 –0.012 –0.630 0.383 –0.013 0.412 0.260 1.587 
0.2 –0.608 –0.929 0.333 –0.012 –0.654 0.359 –0.013 0.412 0.270 1.528 
0.3 –0.608 –0.893 0.298 –0.012 –0.680 0.333 –0.014 0.412 0.280 1.470 
0.4 –0.608 –0.857 0.262 –0.012 –0.709 0.306 –0.015 0.412 0.292 1.411 
0.5 –0.608 –0.822 0.227 –0.012 –0.739 0.276 –0.015 0.412 0.305 1.352 
0.6 –0.608 –0.786 0.191 –0.012 –0.773 0.243 –0.016 0.412 0.318 1.294 
0.7 –0.608 –0.751 0.155 –0.012 –0.810 0.207 –0.017 0.412 0.334 1.235 
0.8 –0.608 –0.715 0.120 –0.012 –0.850 0.167 –0.017 0.412 0.350 1.176 
0.9 –0.608 –0.679 0.084 –0.012 –0.895 0.124 –0.018 0.412 0.369 1.118 
1 –0.608 –0.644 0.048 –0.012 –0.944 0.075 –0.019 0.412 0.389 1.059 
Notes: For definitions of the quantities in each column, see sections 2 and 3. 
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